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15 July 1988

JUDGE:

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On 26 July at 10:00 a.m., you are scheduled to speak in a lecture series hosted by the Congressional Intern Program on Capitol Hill. You will be addressing 300 to 400 college students from around the country who are working this summer in their congressmen and senators' offices. Your proposed remarks run about 15 minutes, and you will be asked to entertain questions for an additional 15 to 20 minutes.

The objective of this lecture series is to provide the students with an understanding of all parts of the federal government. Speakers include congressmen, senators, executive-branch officials, and representatives from independent government agencies and corporations. Those scheduled for this month include Attorney General Meese, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, Senator Boren and Senator Pell. A check with Senator Boren's office indicated that, although intelligence was not the focus of his talk, the Senator referred to his efforts within the SSCI to discourage unauthorized disclosures.

In your proposed remarks, you explain to the students how CIA supports and implements U.S. foreign policy through intelligence and through covert action. You then discuss accountability, briefly considering the three levels of oversight that govern CIA: internal, executive branch, and congressional.

In discussing the Agency's relations with Congress, you mention what you have been doing to encourage openness and what kind of intelligence support we provide to the Hill. In remarking on Congress's increasingly activist role in foreign policy, you suggest that this may be partly due to the intelligence information they receive and use to challenge or improve Administration policy.

The final section of your remarks deals with current intelligence issues and challenges: world developments commanding our attention and recent changes in the nature of intelligence issues and intelligence consumers.

You close by noting the value of a summer in Washington to learn how public policy is really made and with Sir William Stephenson's observation on intelligence.

STAT

Bill Baker

Attachments:
As Stated

PROPOSED REMARKS

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

TO

CONGRESSIONAL INTERNS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

JULY 26, 1988

GOOD MORNING. IT IS A PLEASURE TO COME TO THE HILL TODAY TO
SPEAK WITH YOU. ALL OF YOU DO A BRAVE THING IN COMING TO WASHINGTON
DURING THE HOT, HUMID SUMMER. BUT I THINK YOU WILL BENEFIT GREATLY
FROM THIS CHANCE TO SEE HOW OUR GOVERNMENT REALLY WORKS.

THIS LECTURE SERIES IS A GOOD WAY OF BROADENING YOUR ON-THE-JOB
EXPERIENCE. AND I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW
CIA SUPPORTS AND IMPLEMENTS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY -- WHICH IS QUITE
DIFFERENT FROM MAKING POLICY. I ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS A TOPIC THAT
IS VERY IMPORTANT TO ME, AND THAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY. THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS ACTIONS, NOT ONLY BY
LEGISLATION, BUT THROUGH INTERNAL CONTROLS, EXECUTIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. THE AGENCY'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS INVOLVES MORE THAN OVERSIGHT, AND I WILL
ALSO SPEND SOME TIME TODAY CONSIDERING THAT RELATIONSHIP.

THE CIA'S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO SUPPORT THE MAKING OF U.S. FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY. WE DO THAT BY PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT IS USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE.

POLICYMAKERS DEPEND HEAVILY ON USEFUL, ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE IN A MYRIAD OF SUBJECTS. POLICYMAKERS NEED INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A HOST OF NATIONS AND REGIONS; INTELLIGENCE TO NEGOTIATE AND VERIFY ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS; AND INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF OUR ADVERSARIES. WE FURNISHED VOLUMINOUS SUPPORT TO THE U.S. PARTICIPANTS IN THE JUNE SUMMIT MEETING IN MOSCOW. THIS SUPPORT RANGED FROM BRIEFINGS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO NUMEROUS PAPERS ON ISSUES DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS.

INTELLIGENCE MUST ALSO BE TIMELY. BALLISTIC MISSILES CAN TRAVEL ACROSS CONTINENTS IN MINUTES, GOVERNMENTS CAN BE OVERTHROWN IN A MATTER OF HOURS, AND THE RADIATION FROM A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT CAN SPREAD MANY MILES IN JUST A FEW DAYS. INTELLIGENCE CAN ONLY BE

USEFUL IF IT IS RECEIVED IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION ON IT. THE CIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER IS MANNED AROUND THE CLOCK TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS WORLDWIDE AND ISSUE TIMELY WARNINGS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WHEN U.S. INTERESTS MAY BE AT RISK.

POLICYMAKERS RELY ON OUR INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TO BE USEFUL AND TIMELY, BUT TO REFLECT AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO PERFORM OUR ANALYSIS MUST BE SEEN, NOT AS "COOKING THE BOOKS" TO SHAPE OR INFLUENCE POLICY, BUT AS PROVIDING AN HONEST AND OBJECTIVE VIEW. POLICYMAKERS MUST BE CONFIDENT THEY HAVE THE BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO MAKE THEIR DECISIONS.

PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR ANALYSIS IS ONE OF MY MOST VITAL TASKS. OUR CHIEF GOAL IN CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS TO "TELL IT LIKE IT IS," WITHOUT BIAS OR RESTRAINT. INTEGRITY ALSO MEANS STATING WHAT WE DON'T KNOW -- WHERE THE LIMITS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE ARE AND WHAT UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN.

POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT ALWAYS LIKE THE MESSAGE WE GIVE THEM, ESPECIALLY IF IT CALLS INTO QUESTION THEIR POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONDUCTS ANALYSIS, PARTICULARLY OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THESE ESTIMATES CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY. BUT THEY CANNOT BE CHANGED.

ON SUBJECTS SUCH AS VIETNAM, ANGOLA, LEBANON, IRAN, AND PANAMA, CIA ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT HAVE CHALLENGED SOME OF THE VIEWS HELD BY POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES OUR ANALYSTS HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT MORE OFTEN THEY HAVE BEEN RIGHT. AND ON PROBLEMS BOTH LARGE AND SMALL, THE AGENCY HAS NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING AN HONEST VIEW.

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING POLICYMAKERS WITH INTELLIGENCE, THE CIA PLAYS A ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING POLICY. THIS IS DONE THROUGH ITS COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED BY LAW, THE TERM HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO ACTIVITIES

CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT APPARENT.

THE CAPABILITY FOR COVERT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY. IT ALLOWS THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE NEEDED SUPPORT TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, SOME OF WHOM MAY NOT WISH TO HAVE SUCH U.S. SUPPORT PUBLICLY KNOWN. FASHIONED EFFECTIVELY, COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS COMPLEMENT OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING DIPLOMACY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, AND MILITARY ACTIONS. IN MY LIFETIME, EVERY PRESIDENT FROM FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT FORWARD HAS ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION TO SUPPORT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY.

THE IRAN-CONTRA SITUATION HAS RAISED SOME CONCERN AS TO THE PROPER, LEGAL ROLE OF COVERT ACTION IN ADVANCING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. THE DECISION TO USE COVERT ACTION IS A POLICY DECISION MADE BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. AND, BY LAW, IT IS CIA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT SUCH DECISIONS.

UNDER THE LAW, THE PRESIDENT MUST SIGN A DOCUMENT KNOWN AS A "FINDING" TO AUTHORIZE COVERT ACTION. FINDINGS ARE SHARED WITH THE TWO INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES, AND THE FUNDS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE APPROVED BY CONGRESS. UNDER A RECENTLY ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE, THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL REVIEW, REVISE, AND REVALIDATE ALL OF THE CIA'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. THEY ASK THREE BASIC QUESTIONS IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO BEGIN OR CONTINUE A COVERT ACTION: IS IT LEGAL, WILL IT EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE OUR FOREIGN POLICY, AND DOES IT MAKE SENSE?

THE CIA IS GOVERNED BY OVERSIGHT AS WELL AS BY LAW. IN FACT, OVERSIGHT OCCURS AT THREE LEVELS. THE FIRST IS AN INTERNAL ONE, DIRECTED BY THE AGENCY'S OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL AND OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. STRENGTHENING THE MANDATE AND RESOURCES OF THESE OFFICES WAS ONE OF MY FIRST PRIORITIES UPON BEING APPOINTED DIRECTOR ONE YEAR AGO.

THE CIA IS ALSO SUBJECT TO OVERSIGHT WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BY AN ENTITY KNOWN AS THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD. THIS BOARD IS A PERMANENT, NONPARTISAN BODY CONSISTING OF THREE MEMBERS FROM OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WHO ARE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT.

FINALLY, THE CIA IS SUBJECT TO EXTENSIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT THROUGH THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

LET ME FOCUS FOR A MOMENT ON THE AGENCY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS, SINCE I KNOW THAT IS OF INTEREST TO YOU. AND IT IS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO ME. THE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES EXERCISED BY CONGRESS ARE BOTH NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL. A DEPENDABLE SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY BUILDS, RATHER THAN ERODES, TRUST BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND THOSE WHO ARE THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS PART OF MY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS, I MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES AT LEAST MONTHLY. AND I HAVE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE AGENCY'S DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS, SO THAT ALL OF OUR OFFICERS ARE AWARE THAT, WHILE THEY NEED TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS, THEY MUST ALSO BE ABSOLUTELY CANDID WITH CONGRESS.

I THINK WE'VE GOT EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES RIGHT NOW, AND THEY'RE BEING MANAGED WITH GREAT CONCERN TO KEEP OUR SECRETS SECRET. PROTECTING SECRETS IS EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT -- I'VE HEARD IT SAID THAT A SECRET IS THE ONLY THING THAT CIRCULATES MORE RAPIDLY THAN MONEY. BUT I THINK THAT THE COMMITTEES ARE DOING A FINE JOB OF PROTECTING INFORMATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO RECOMMEND NEW OR DIFFERENT COURSES OF ACTION.

I UNDERSTAND THAT SENATOR BOREN SPOKE TO YOU EARLIER THIS MONTH. I DON'T THINK HE WOULD DISAGREE WHEN I SAY THAT THE CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS IS BENEFICIAL TO BOTH PARTIES. I WOULD

NOTE, ALSO, THAT THE CENTRAL ROLE CONGRESS PLAYS WITH RESPECT TO THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS UNIQUE, BOTH IN OUR HISTORY AS A NATION, AND IN THE WORLD AT LARGE.

THE CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS GOES WELL BEYOND THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY. AND CIA PROVIDES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, RESEARCH PAPERS, AND BRIEFINGS, NOT ONLY TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES, BUT ALSO TO THE APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES.

EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES RECEIVE THE CIA'S DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT. IN 1987, THE CIA SENT MORE THAN 5,000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS. WE ALSO GAVE OVER 1,000 BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS. TOPICS INCLUDED ARMS CONTROL, SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION, AND CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING BRIEFINGS AND PAPERS, WE TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS ON LEGISLATION RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE AND IN HEARINGS ON WORLD EVENTS WHERE OUR EXPERTISE CAN BE USEFUL. I SPEND A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME ON THE HILL MYSELF. IN FACT, I PROBABLY DEVOTE ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF MY TIME TO DEALING WITH CONGRESS. AND MY SENIOR MANAGERS COLLECTIVELY DEVOTE ABOUT ONE-QUARTER OF THEIR TIME TO CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

TWO ISSUES HAVE BROUGHT ME AND MANY OTHER CIA OFFICERS TO THE HILL IN RECENT MONTHS. BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING NEW INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION, AND I HAVE TESTIFIED SEVERAL TIMES -- MOST RECENTLY BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE IN JUNE -- ON THE NEED FOR SUCH LEGISLATION AND ITS PRACTICAL IMPACT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE CIA ALSO PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY. MY DEPUTY, BOB GATES, AND I PROVIDED FORMAL TESTIMONY ON THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO MONITOR THE TREATY. SENIOR SOVIET EXPERTS IN THE AGENCY TESTIFIED TO THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY ON SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY. THEY ALSO PRESENTED OUR JUDGMENTS ON SOVIET INCENTIVES AND CAPABILITIES TO CHEAT ON TREATY PROVISIONS. THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONGRESS'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE INF TREATY.

DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OR SO, CONGRESS HAS TAKEN AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE ROLE IN FORMULATING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PROBABLY A NUMBER OF REASONS FOR THIS, I THINK THAT THE INFORMATION CONGRESS RECEIVES FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION HAS ALLOWED CONGRESS TO CHALLENGE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSALS AND INITIATE THEIR OWN. (S)

THIS WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE, SO I'D LIKE TO TAKE A MOMENT TO LOOK AT THE SORT OF INFORMATION WE WILL BE PROVIDING TO CONGRESS AND POLICYMAKERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DURING THE COMING MONTHS.

THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO RECEIVE A LARGE PART OF OUR ATTENTION. GORBACHEV'S PERESTROIKA INVOLVES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND EVEN MILITARY CHANGE WITH GREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR HIS OWN COUNTRY AND, INDEED, FOR THE WORLD.

THE HIGH PRIORITY OF ARMS CONTROL IN BOTH MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON PRESENTS A HOST OF REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL PLAY A LARGE ROLE IN MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE INF TREATY. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, TO HELP ENSURE THAT U.S. PROPOSALS ARE BASED ON A SOUND UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE AND U.S. MONITORING CAPABILITIES.

NOW, MORE THAN EVER, THE CIA MUST ANALYZE DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE SOVIET UNION. DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, WE WILL CLOSELY WATCH SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPACT ON THAT COUNTRY. THE EXPLOSIVE, UNPREDICTABLE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REQUIRES OUR ONGOING ATTENTION, AND WE CAN EXPECT EVEN MORE TURMOIL AND POLITICAL INFIGHTING WHEN KHOMEINI DIES.

OTHER ISSUES REQUIRING OUR SCRUTINY INCLUDE THE FUTURE OF NORIEGA AND PANAMA; THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC-MISSILE TECHNOLOGY; AND THE IMPACT OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN THOSE COUNTRIES HARDEST HIT BY THE DISEASE.

THIS INCREASED DIVERSITY OF INTELLIGENCE ISSUES HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER AND DIVERSITY OF INTELLIGENCE USERS. WE PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE TO NEARLY EVERY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS TO THE CONGRESS.

WHILE POLICYMAKERS CONCENTRATE ON TODAY'S CRISES AND CONCERNS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST IDENTIFY ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES THIS COUNTRY WILL ENCOUNTER IN TOMORROW'S WORLD, FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW, AND EVEN WELL INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.

THIS SUMMER IN WASHINGTON WILL, NO DOUBT, SHOW YOU HOW PUBLIC POLICY IS REALLY MADE AND CARRIED OUT; HOW DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT WORK -- OR DON'T WORK -- TOGETHER; AND WHAT POLICY ISSUES

CONFRONT US NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. THIS KNOWLEDGE SHOULD SERVE YOU WELL, INCREASING YOUR INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND PERHAPS EVEN PROMPTING YOU TO CONSIDER A CAREER IN PUBLIC SERVICE. I HAVE FOUND THAT MY EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN A BURDEN, BUT A VERY REAL JOY AND PRIVILEGE.

I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE YOU WITH ONE FINAL THOUGHT, FROM AN OLD FRIEND OF MINE, SIR WILLIAM STEPHENSON. SIR WILLIAM PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN U.S.-BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DURING WORLD WAR II. IN THE FOREWORD TO A BOOK ABOUT HIM, A MAN CALLED INTREPID, SIR WILLIAM MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATION: "PERHAPS A DAY WILL DAWN WHEN TYRANTS CAN NO LONGER THREATEN THE LIBERTY OF ANY PEOPLE, WHEN THE FUNCTION OF ALL NATIONS, HOWEVER VARIED THEIR IDEOLOGIES, WILL BE TO ENHANCE LIFE, NOT TO CONTROL IT. IF SUCH A CONDITION IS POSSIBLE, IT IS IN A FUTURE TOO FAR DISTANT TO FORESEE. UNTIL THAT SAFER, BETTER DAY, THE DEMOCRACIES WILL AVOID DISASTER, AND POSSIBLY TOTAL DESTRUCTION, ONLY BY MAINTAINING THEIR DEFENSES."

"AMONG THE INCREASINGLY INTRICATE ARSENALS ACROSS THE WORLD, INTELLIGENCE IS AN ESSENTIAL WEAPON, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT. BUT IT IS, BEING SECRET, THE MOST DANGEROUS. SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT ITS ABUSE MUST BE DEVISED, REVISED, AND RIGIDLY APPLIED. BUT, AS IN ALL ENTERPRISE, THE CHARACTER AND WISDOM OF THOSE TO WHOM IT IS ENTRUSTED WILL BE DECISIVE. IN THE INTEGRITY OF THAT GUARDIANSHIP LIES THE HOPE OF FREE PEOPLE TO ENDURE AND PREVAIL."